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I. INTRODUCTION
According to World Bank estimates, more than one trillion
dollars in bribes are paid each year.1 In response to the growing
threat of corruption in international business, the administration of
George W. Bush inaugurated an era of stringent anti-bribery
enforcement.2 The Obama Administration continued this legacy,
making it a priority to crack down on incidences of global bribery.3
In a surging wave of prosecutions against multinational
corporations, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) invoked the broad
jurisdictional scope of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA” or
“the Act”). The government’s enforcement tactics have relied
heavily on the 1998 amendments to the FCPA—Sections 78 dd-1–
3 specifically—which broadened the power of the DOJ to prosecute
companies and individuals, both in the United States and abroad.
From its very inception, however, the FCPA relied on vague
language to define the recipients of bribes and the nature of bribery.
The problem was compounded by the 1998 amendments, which
greatly expanded jurisdiction of the FCPA. The law’s lack of clarity
gave considerable power to prosecutors to interpret its reach.
Although FCPA enforcement increased in the past decade, an
overwhelming number of prosecutions did not result in trials;
instead, it produced a proliferation of pleas and pre-trial diversion
agreements, such as Non Prosecution Agreements (“NPAs”) and
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (“DPAs”).4 In the overwhelming
1
Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global Governance
Director
Daniel
Kaufmann,
WORLD
BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190295~menuPK:34457~pagePK:3437
0~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
2
Mike Koehler, FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR, http://www. fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa101#q19 (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (arguing that the main reasons for the growth in
FCPA enforcement include “companies (large and small and across a variety of industry
sectors). . . mov[ing] into international markets”; the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act
in 2002 which “has caused issuers to more actively investigate questionable
transactions particularly in foreign subsidiaries”; increased resources for enforcement
agencies; stronger focus on international business by foreign law enforcement; and
increased monitoring of enforcement activity by NGOs and civil society).
3
According to Attorney General Eric Holder, FCPA prosecutions are necessary
because “paying large monetary penalties cannot be viewed by the business
community as merely ‘the cost of doing business.’” Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen.,
Remarks at the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (May 31,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100531.html.
4
The FCPA has more settlement based on NPAs and DPAs than any other area of
corporate criminality. Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 907, 933–34 (2010) (“While NPAs and DPAs are utilized in non-FCPA enforcement
actions, the ‘lion’s share’ of these agreements are used to resolve FCPA enforcement
actions”). For a discussion on Non Prosecution Agreements and Deferred Prosecution
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number of FCPA prosecutions, corporations negotiate a deal before
the case ever reaches the courtroom. Corporations prefer to settle,
pay the fines levied, and continue to pursue business, rather than
risk the high penalties and publicity that can result from a trial.5
Individuals, many of whom are not U.S. citizens, are also likely to
plead guilty and receive a reduced penalty, rather than risk a trial.6
More importantly, unlike many areas of the law in which most cases
are resolved through trial and settlement, there is almost a complete
absence of judicial review of the FCPA.7 The strong incentive to
accept liability—what I call the “culture of settlement” in this
Article—gives the DOJ enormous discretion in its interpretation of
the FCPA.8 Due to the scarcity of trials, the most frequent
interpretation of the FCPA has come from the DOJ and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), not federal judges.
This lack of precedent allows FCPA investigations to be conducted
largely on the DOJ’s terms. The jurisdictional language of the FCPA

Agreements in the context of corporate criminality, see generally Brandon Garrett,
Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007) (considering the issues and
strategy associated with prosecutors who seek structural reform remedies for accused
corporations); Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The
Department of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2006)
(suggesting that corporations try to negotiate more lenient terms with prosecutors
when given the opportunity).
5
See Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate
Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434 (2007); Finder & McConnell, supra note
4, at 1.
6
It is worth noting from the outset that the issue of whether to go to trial in an
individual prosecution depends on different factors than a corporate prosecution. The
strength of the evidence, the prosecutor’s offer of settlement, the threat of a harsher
penalty at trial, and the accused’s beliefs about their own culpability all inform the
decision of whether to go to trial.
7
Koehler, supra note 4, at 932 (“The fact remains that every corporate FCPA
enforcement action over the last two decades has been resolved through a DOJ NPA,
DPA, plea (or combination thereof) or SEC settlement, and nearly every individual
FCPA enforcement action has been resolved through a plea or SEC settlement.”).
8
Although the FCPA is unique in its lack of judicial review, the FCPA “culture of
settlement” does reflect a larger habit of settlement in other areas of corporate
criminality. When compared with individual criminal defendants, corporations must
protect the value of their company, have more financial resources at their disposal, and
do not face the same possibilities of jail time. For a general discussion of larger trends
of settlement in corporate criminality, see Samuel Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity
Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 507 (2006) (arguing that in choosing to settle, a
corporation can “dampen[] reputational damage by portraying itself as accepting
responsibility”); Andrew Weissman & David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 415 (2007) (arguing that it is difficult for corporations to
avoid settlement and that “even institutions as powerful in the financial world as
Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase can cave under pressure to settle to avoid an
indictment, even an unjust one”).
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is very broad, but critics have challenged whether many defendants
in these cases even belong in American courts.
This Article focuses on two weaknesses of the FCPA: the issue
of jurisdiction, specifically its expansion in sections 78dd-1 through
78dd-3 in the 1998 Amendments, and second, the lack of judicial
review, a result of the preference shown by both prosecution and
defense to settle outside of court. These two issues are closely
linked. The initially vague language of the 1977 FCPA, coupled with
the later expansion of jurisdiction, gave the DOJ a wide mandate to
prosecute almost anyone anywhere. The corporate “culture of
settlement” led to an abundance of pleas, pretrial agreements, and
a paucity of precedent.
In 2011, the DOJ launched the largest ever prosecution of
individuals under the FCPA in what became known as “The Africa
Sting Trials.” The prosecution had a strong expectation of
settlement. But after most of the defendants collectively refused to
plead, a jury trial commenced, and the FCPA was exposed to rare
judicial scrutiny. The case resulted in several ‘not guilty’ verdicts,
two mistrials, and the DOJ’s eventual dismissal of all charges. The
trial exposed weaknesses in the government’s use of evidence, in the
sting operation, and most importantly, in the vague language and
the expanded jurisdiction of the Act. In the first ever ruling on
section 78dd-3 of the FCPA, Judge Leon restricted the jurisdiction of
the FCPA over foreigners.9 Yet additional steps are still needed to
clarify the language of the statute. Clarification of the vague
language in section 78dd-3, in particular, would serve to define
jurisdiction more precisely and to counter uncertainty created by the
“culture of settlement” and lack of judicial review.
As this Article will show, much of the confusion results from a
key phrase relating to acts “in furtherance of an offer” of bribery. In
order to prosecute either a U.S. citizen or a foreigner either abroad
or on U.S. territory for violation of the FCPA, the statutory language
is not clear as to whether the act itself must be illegal or whether it
can be a legal act committed in furtherance of an illegal bribery
scheme. At present, there is no agreement about the meaning of the
language and interpretations vary widely. This Article suggests one
important change in that language that will make the law clearer.
This Article surveys the FCPA, its history, weaknesses, and
prospects for successful enforcement. Part I reviews the history of
the FCPA and its amendments, followed by a recommendation for
9

See Sections III.A–III.D.
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reforming the language of section 78dd-3 of the Act. Part II
examines the “culture of settlement” that has resulted from
corporate prosecutions and the effect on the prosecution of foreign
nationals. Part III analyzes the outcome of the Africa Sting Trials—
including the role of judicial review in narrowing jurisdiction—
illustrating the need for further clarification of the text of the FCPA.
II. HISTORY OF THE FCPA AND ITS 1988 AND 1998 AMENDMENTS
This Part examines the origins of, as well as the 1988 and 1998
amendments to, the FCPA. It surveys significant arguments that
have been made about the jurisdictional reach of the Act. Section
I.A looks at the inception of the FCPA as a response to corruption in
the Nixon era.
Section I.B examines the 1988 and 1998
amendments, noting significant ambiguities in the language of the
law. Section I.C surveys the debate about whether the FCPA is
overly broad in its extraterritorial enforcement.
A. Origins of the FCPA
The FCPA has its origins in the Watergate Scandal of 1975.10
During an investigation of Nixon and his close advisors, federal
agents discovered undisclosed “slush funds” established by U.S.based multinational corporations to influence elections.11 Nixon’s
campaign had received money from these funds, which it used to
bribe foreign officials and law enforcement agents.12 After Vietnam,
the Carter Administration sought to rehabilitate the global image of
the United States,13 and in 1977, Congress unanimously passed the
FCPA. President Carter hailed the bill as historic, noting that
“[c]orrupt practices between corporations and public officials
overseas undermine the integrity and stability of governments and
harm our relations with other countries. . . . This law makes corrupt
payments to foreign officials illegal under United States law.”14
When the legislation was passed, the United States became the first
10

S. Rep. No. 93-981, at 445–92 (1974).
Id.
12
Id.
13
Kevin Davis, Why Does the United States Regulate Foreign Bribery: Moralism, SelfInterest, or Altruism?, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 499–500 (2012); see also George
Esper, Communists Take Over Saigon; U.S. Rescue Fleet is Picking Up Vietnamese Who Fled
in Boats, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1975, available at http://www.nytimes.com/learning/
general/onthisday /big/0430.htmlarticle.
14
President James E. Carter, Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure
Bill Statement on Signing S. 305 into Law, 2 Pub. Papers 2157 (Dec. 20, 1977), available
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7036.
11

REDIKER FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

58

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

2/5/2016 8:40 PM

[Vol. 40:1

and only country in the world with strict penalties for companies
engaged in business practices that involved bribery.15
The FCPA criminalized any use of U.S. funds to bribe foreign
officials.16 Its substantive sections were comprised of accounting
and anti-bribery provisions.17 Its accounting provisions required
public companies to “make and keep books, records, and accounts,
which in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”18 Its antibribery provisions covered two groups: issuers of certain securities
regulated by the SEC, including American Depository Receipts,19
and “domestic concerns,” which included “any individual who is a
citizen, national or resident of the United States or any corporation,
partnership, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated
organization, or sole proprietorship” which has its principal place
of business in the United States, or is organized under the laws of
the United States.20 To be liable for prosecution, issuers or domestic
concerns had to make use of the U.S. mails or “any instrumentality
of interstate commerce” to make an offer, payment, promise to pay,
or gift for the purpose “of obtaining or retaining business” to one of
three recipients.21
These recipient groups included “foreign
officials”; foreign political parties, officials of such parties, or their
candidates; or a person accepting the role of intermediary “while
knowing or having reason to know“ about the bribery between the
issuer or domestic concern and the foreign official or political
party.22 Congress specifically refrained from asserting jurisdiction
15
Robert Blume & Taylor McConkie, Navigating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
The Increasing Cost of Overseas Bribery, 36 COLO. LAW. 91, 91 (2007).
16
Melissa Kelly Hurst, Eliminating Bribery in International Business Transactions, 6 J.
INT’L L. & PRAC. 111, 120 (1997).
17
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd (1)–(3), 78ff (2006)) [hereinafter FCPA of
1977].
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
In the original version passed in 1977, the FCPA prohibited payments to third
parties if an issuer “knew” or there was “reason to know” that all or a portion of the
payment would be given, offered, or promised to a foreign official. This inspired
serious debate, with critics stating that the term “reason to know” was ambiguous
enough that negligent payments could fall within its scope. See H. Lowell Brown,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under The 1998 Amendments To The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: Does The Government’s Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
239 (2001); Lisa Harriman Randall, Multilateralization of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 657 (1997); Robert S. Levy, The Antibribery Provisions of the
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over non-U.S. individuals and companies.23
The language of the Act was vague from its inception. Two of
the Act’s greatest weaknesses were that it failed to lucidly define
“foreign official” and the phrase “obtaining and retaining business”
or “directing business to any person.” Both of the terms from the
original FCPA were unchanged by later amendments. “Foreign
official” was defined as “any officer or employee of a foreign
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such
government or department, agency, or instrumentality.”24 The
definition left open the possibility that any employee or official of
a state-owned enterprise might be considered a “foreign official,”
thus encompassing much of the population in countries with
socialist governments or a preponderance of state-owned
enterprises.25 In United States v. Esquenazi (a case which will be
considered below), an appellate court is expected to rule for the first
time as to who can be classified a “foreign official” under the
FCPA.26
The phrase “obtaining and retaining business” was also quite
vague in scope. The defendant in United States v. Kozeny was charged
with conspiring to violate the FCPA because he funneled payments
to Azeri officials to encourage the privatization of a state-owned oil
company in Azerbaijan.27 The language left it unclear whether
payments made in the direction of privatization, the first step to
business, would be considered bribery.28 Similarly, in United States
v. Kay, the court ruled that the phrase “to obtain or retain business”
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Are They Really As Valuable As We Think They Are?,
10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 71, 79–80 (1985).
23
Brown, supra note 22, at 292 (“Congress ultimately decided not to include
foreign nationals within the definition of a domestic concern. In effect, unless a foreign
national was an ‘issuer’ or there was some other basis for the United States to assert
jurisdiction, a foreign national was beyond the reach of the Act.”).
24
FCPA of 1977, supra note 17.
25
DOJ Files Response Brief in Historic 11th Circuit “Foreign Official” Appeal, FCPA
PROFESSOR BLOG (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-files-responsebrief-in-historic-11th-circuit-foreign-official-appeal.
26
Id. (The 11th Circuit will determine a “host of issues, including whether the trial
court erred as a matter of law in its jury instruction regarding what constitutes an
‘instrumentality’ of a foreign government – and thus who are ‘foreign officials’ under
the FCPA.”).
27
United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 541 F.3d
166 (2d Cir. 2008).
28
In this way, it potentially included the many businesses and NGOs that entered
the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Eastern Europe with the aim of encouraging and
profiting from the break up of state-owned concerns.
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was “genuinely debatable and thus ambiguous.”29 The court
reasoned that the “most significant statutory construction problem
results from the failure of the language of the FCPA to give a clear
indication of the exact scope of the business nexus element.”30 The
hazy language of 1977 was never clarified, either through judicial
review or further emendation. It has remained the core of the FCPA
to the present, and its lack of clarity has been exacerbated by the
expansion of jurisdiction in the amendments.
B. The 1988 and 1998 Amendments
The 1977 version of the FCPA was amended by the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act and the International and AntiBribery Fair Competition Act, in 1988 and 1998, respectively. The
initial purpose of the FCPA was to police only the illicit conduct of
American businesses. There was nonetheless an expectation held by
Congress and in policy circles that other nations would pass similar
legislation in the wake of the FCPA.31 International support,
however, did not follow, and though FCPA enforcement was rare,
some critics blamed Congress for harming American businesses.32
In the eleven years following the passage of the FCPA, there was a
growing sentiment in Congress that efforts to combat corruption
must occur on a global, rather than national, scale.33
In 1988, Congress took concrete steps to encourage the
international community to follow the lead of the United States by
enacting anti-bribery legislation.
The Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act formally called upon President Reagan to
29
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 743–44 (5th Cir. 2004) (“In approaching
this issue, the district court concluded that the FCPA’s language is ambiguous, and
proceeded to review the statute’s legislative history. We agree with the court’s finding
of ambiguity. . . .”). Some authors have argued that despite the court’s characterization
of the FCPA as ambiguous, the case has led to a further increase in prosecutions. See
Evan P. Lestelle, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International Norms of Foreign Public
Bribery, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 83 TUL. L. REV. 527, 535 (2008) (“In the nearly
three years since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kay, the SEC brought more FCPA
enforcement actions than in any 36-month period since the statute’s enactment.”).
30
Kay, 359 F.3d at 744.
31
Daniel Patrick Ashe, Note, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United States:
The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2897, 2906 (2005).
32
PIERRE CHARPIE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL ANTI-BRIBERY LAWS 45 (2003) (citing Business Accounting and Foreign
Trade Simplification Act: Hearings on S. 430 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. And
Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1986)).
33
Id.
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pursue international agreements that supported enforcement of the
FCPA.34 The language of the 1988 amendments sharpened the focus
of the FCPA by modifying the Act’s state of mind requirement35 and
adding two affirmative defenses.36 As to the state of mind
requirement, legislators sought to move away from the 1977
requirement that parties “know” or “have a reason to know“ about
the bribery since they did not want to encourage willful blindness
on behalf of corrupt third parties, but also did not want to
criminalize simple negligence.37 Congress thus amended the Act to
criminalize the payment of third-party bribes, but only if the payor
had actual knowledge of the intended results or acted with a
conscious disregard for the truth.38 The affirmative defenses further
protected individuals from liability in cases where their payments
were legal in the country in which they were made, or considered
“reasonable and bona fide expenditures.”39 In addition to the
affirmative defenses, the law was amended to allow for “grease
payments,” that is, money paid to facilitate or hasten routine
business transactions.40 The defenses and amendments thus
encouraged a more flexible standard of adherence to the FCPA,
34
Ashe, supra note 31, at 2906 (“Moreover, the amendment allowed an affirmative
defense if the payment to the foreign public official was lawful in the jurisdiction of
the bribe recipient. The 1988 amendments also created an affirmative defense for
reasonable expenses directly related to legitimate promotional activities.”).
35
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 to 78dd-3
(2000)); Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd3 (2000)); FCPA of 1977, supra note 17, at § 78dd (1)–(3).
36
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 to 78dd-3
(2000)); Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 to 78dd-3
(2000)); FCPA of 1977, supra note 17, at §§ 78dd (1)–(3); Ashe supra note 31, at 2902.
37
FCPA of 1977, supra note 17, at §§ 78dd(1)–(3); Ashe, supra note 31, at 2902.
38
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd-3
(2000)) [hereinafter “FCPA of 1988”].
39
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c) (2006) (for issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(c) (2006) (for
domestic concerns); 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-3(c) (2006) (for any person). Little case law
exists to interpret the scope of the first affirmative defense, although one court has
interpreted it rather narrowly. See U.S. v. Kozeny, supra note 27, at 697. The defendant
was charged under the FCPA with bribing a government official in Azerbaijan. Id. The
defendant argued, however, that he was not guilty of bribery under Azeri law because
the bribe was extorted from him and he then reported the bribe to the authorities. U.S.
v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Under Azeri law, an individual
who is extorted and then reports the event cannot be held criminally liable for bribery.
Id.
40
FCPA of 1988, supra note 38. For instance, “grease payments” could be made
for: governmental processing of foreign documents, such as visas; obtaining police
protection; securing utilities; certain transportation costs; and the delivery of mail. See
also Rajib Sanyal, Patterns in International Bribery: Violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV., 1, 4 (2012).
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while preserving its principles as a model for other countries.
In the 1990s, President Clinton urged the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) to adopt the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in
International Business Transactions (“the Convention”).41 The U.S.
government used diplomatic pressure, empirical evidence on the
negative costs of bribery, and public sentiment against corruption
to make its case.42 The United States and eighteen member
countries ratified the Convention, pledging to pass legislation in
their home countries to prohibit bribery of foreign officials.43 The
OECD greatly enlarged the jurisdiction of bribery investigations,
using even broader language than the amendment changes to the
FCPA that would soon be adopted in 1998.44 The Convention
called for the jurisdictional provision to be “interpreted broadly
[enough] so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery act
is not required.”45 The FCPA, as amended, unquestionably followed
this mandate.46 Following ratification by the United States and
other member states, the OECD Convention went into effect on
February 15, 1999.47
In October 1998, Congress consequently amended the FCPA to
conform to the international standards set by the OECD

41

See generally OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998)
[hereinafter OECD Convention].
42
See id. at 1. The Convention entered into force February 15, 1999 upon the
ratification of eighteen countries. By the end of 2001, the OECD Convention was in
force for all thirty OECD member countries except Ireland, plus five non-member
countries-Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and Slovenia. Lisa M. Landmeier et al.,
Anti-Corruption International Legal Developments, 36 INT’L LAW. 589, 591 (2002).
43
By 2001, the OECD Convention was implemented by all 30 OECD member
countries (except for Ireland), plus five non-member countries: Argentina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Chile, and Slovenia. Landmeier, supra note 42, at 591.
44
See OECD Convention, supra note 41, at 1. The Convention chose to define a
“foreign official” more broadly than the FCPA, as not only “any person holding a
legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country,” but also as officials or
agents of “a public international organization.” However, the OECD Convention was
not self-executing nor did it include a model law against corruption. See Padideh Ala’i,
The Legacy of Geographic Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current
Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 877, 924 (2000) (The OECD
“provides only rough guidelines for its implementing legislation. . . . In view of the
functional equivalency approach, there is little the OECD Convention requires
Member States to do in their implementing legislation other than criminalize bribery
of foreign public officials”).
45
See OECD Convention, supra note 41, at 10.
46
Brown, supra note 22, at 285–88.
47
Ala’i, supra note 44, at 923.
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Convention. The 1998 amendment broadened definitions within
the FCPA’s first section and expanded its jurisdictional reach
through the modification of sections 78dd-1–3. Sections 78dd-1
and 78dd-2 dealt with issuers and domestic concerns and
introduced three main changes. First, these sections expanded the
definition of “foreign official” to include public international
organizations (such as the United Nations) and their employees.48
Second, they broadened the definition of bribery to include illegal
payments that secure “any improper advantage, not simply to
obtain or retain business.”49 Third, and most significantly, they
vastly expanded the FCPA’s jurisdiction.50 The FCPA originally
defined jurisdiction “by use of the mails or means of interstate
commerce” and applied only to American citizens and entities.51
Issuers and domestic concerns, or their respective agents, could now
be charged with violations of the FCPA “irrespective of whether such
issuer or such officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder
makes use of the mails or instrumentality of interstate commerce
. . . .”52 The jurisdictional limits imposed by the 1977 FCPA, defined
by use of mails and interstate commerce, were removed, thus
criminalizing an entirely new set of acts taken by issuers, domestic
concerns, or U.S. citizens while abroad.
Part (a) of section 78dd-3 further augmented the jurisdiction of
the FCPA beyond the issuers, domestic concerns, and their agents
who were the focus of the 1977 Act.53 For the first time, it made
anti-bribery provisions applicable to foreign citizens who could
now be charged for violations if they made “use of the U.S. mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce“54 or
committed any other act in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise, etc., “while in the territory of the United States.” 55 Not
only did section 78dd-3 now include foreigners in its expanded
jurisdiction, such foreigners did not have to use the mails or
interstate commerce to be liable for prosecution. Sections 78dd-1
through 78dd-3 thus made the U.S. mails and interstate commerce
48
The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-366, §4, 112 Stat. 3306 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78dd-3 (2006))
[hereinafter “FCPA of 1998”].
49
Id.
50
FCPA of 1988, supra note 48, § 78dd-3.
51
FCPA of 1977, supra note 17.
52
FCPA of 1998, supra note 48, § 78dd-1.
53
FCPA of 1998, supra note 48, § 78dd-3.
54
Id.
55
Id.
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only one of several possible avenues for prosecution. The sum of its
jurisdictional changes made U.S. issuers, domestic concerns, and
individuals liable for actions committed abroad, and foreigners
liable for actions committed in the territory of the United States,
with use of the mails or interstate commerce, or for “any other act
in furtherance” of bribery.56
As it stands today, the FCPA includes the core language of 1977,
along with additional provisions for a new state of mind
requirement, affirmative defenses, and grease payments. It contains
a broadened definition of “foreign officials,” language adding
“securing any improper advantage” to the obtaining or retaining
business clause, and expanded jurisdiction.57
The FCPA’s
proscriptions apply to three groups: “issuers” (corporations with
registered securities in the United States) and individuals acting on
their behalf; “domestic concerns” and individuals acting on their
behalf; and any other person (including foreign citizens) who
corruptly makes use of the U.S. mails and interstate commerce, or
does any other act in furtherance of an offer, payment, etc. on U.S.
territory.58 The large extraterritorial scope of the Act engendered a
vigorous academic debate about the considerable expansion of
jurisdiction and the right of the United States (and the OECD) to
police the business practices of other countries
C. Debating the 1998 Amendments and Issues of Jurisdiction
The crux of the debate concerned the tension between
prosecutorial interpretation of the FCPA’s breadth and the rights of
foreign nations to combat bribery using their own domestic
mechanisms. Critics maintained that the broad reach of the 1998
amendments exceeded the FCPA’s original jurisdictional mandate.
They offered four major critiques of the FCPA’s extraterritorial
application. First, some critics claimed that the OECD guidelines
reflect the policy of only the world’s wealthiest industrialized
countries.59 Second, some noted that bribery is a culturally specific
practice, with a less pejorative connotation in parts of the
developing world.60 Third, some said that enforcement of the FCPA
56

Id.
Id.
58
FCPA of 1998, supra note 48, at § 78dd-3 (for any person).
59
Lestelle, supra note 29, at 536 (“There is a notable characteristic of the states
party to the OECD Convention: the parties are the primary exporters of global capital.
. . .Of the thirty-six states that have ratified the OECD Convention, these countries are
responsible for approximately ninety percent of foreign direct investment.”).
60
What might be considered bribery in the United States, for example, may be a
57
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by the United States created “institutional displacement,” inhibiting
the development of local institutions.61 Fourth, critics noted that an
overly aggressive U.S. policy against bribery might heighten
diplomatic tensions.62
Proponents of the FCPA engaged these critiques, arguing that
the Act did not permit an overly broad extraterritorial application of
American law.63 They noted that the passage of the FCPA and its
subsequent amendments was the result of decades of diplomacy
and initiatives to educate the global community about the
deleterious effects of bribery.64 After the OECD guidelines came
into effect in 1999, many nations, including the United Kingdom,
adopted their own anti-bribery legislation.65 No significant
diplomatic rifts resulted from American enforcement of the FCPA.66
Indeed, a new global collaboration to police bribery in international
business emerged. Proponents also contended that a clear
difference between bribery and “gift giving” had always existed.67
Bribery, unlike gifts, involved large sums, and FCPA prosecutions

commonly accepted and even expected “gift giving” in other countries. See Steven
Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L.
419, 431–32 (1999) (“Within this culturally bound ambiguity, the subtle gradations
of acceptable business practices with regard to gratuities, favors and gifts are a potential
mine field for legislators seeking to exert their influence extraterritorially.”).
61
Although the U.S. may be more committed to and effective in combating
corruption than developing countries, the improvement of local institutions is more
important in the long run than short-term enforcement. Davis, supra note 13, at 509
(“As a theoretical matter this concern [‘institutional displacement’] arises even in
situations in which U.S. institutions are clearly more effective in combating corruption
than local institutions. Even then, the net impact of relying on U.S. institutions might
be negative if their operation tends to inhibit the long-term development of local
institutions.”).
62
Marie Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 583, 584 (2006).
63
Philip Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 627, 646 (“This article reviews and rejects the claim that anti-bribery
laws constitute an intrusion thrust upon other countries.”); Ashe, supra note 31, at 8
(“Rather than viewing recent expanded and aggressive FCPA enforcement as morally
imperious, these actions should be seen as working to advance international
partnership in addressing a complex and entrenched problem.”); Lauren Giudice,
Note, Regulating Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Current Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enforcement, 91 B.U. L. REV. 347, 360 (2011).
64
Nichols, supra note 63, at 637–39.
65
See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Conflict of Minerals (Jun. 19, 2013)
available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/conflict-minerals/legally-bindingprocess/uk-bribery-act.
66
Nichols, supra note 63, at 646 (“In . . . twenty years, not one meaningful
diplomatic rift can be attributed to enforcement of the Act.”).
67
Id.
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only targeted bribes in excess of tens of thousands of dollars.68
Finally, if the United States abdicated its role in regulating supplyside bribery, the problem would only worsen.69
On balance, there is some common ground among the FCPA’s
critics and proponents, including the widespread disapproval of
major governmental corruption.70
Nonetheless, the debate
underscores serious issues regarding the broad jurisdictional
language of sections 78dd-1 through 78dd-3.71
III. FCPA ENFORCEMENT AND THE “CULTURE OF SETTLEMENT”
The problems stemming from the vague language and broad
scope of the FCPA are compounded by the willingness of
corporations to settle their cases without going to trial. Although
corporate settlement is quite common in many areas of the law, the
FCPA is unique in its lack of precedent. The environment of
enforcement strongly informs the need for legislative reform of
FCPA section 78dd-3. The legal ambiguities associated with the
prosecution of foreign nationals stem from a corporate “culture of
settlement” and unchecked prosecutorial discretion over
jurisdiction. The expansion of the FCPA’s jurisdictional scope under
68

Id.
Id.
70
For example, significant governmental corruption—as opposed to gift-giving—
is a universally rejected practice, although cultural interpretations as to what constitutes
bribery vary from region to region. See Salbu, supra note 60, at 423–24 (“Although
some disagree, I concede the contention of FCPA supporters that a generic disdain for
corruption is a universal value, transcending national borders. . . . I would . . . suggest
that while all cultures eschew corruption, culture remains a critical differentiator as
opinions vary on what conduct falls inside and outside of that label.”). On the issue
of diplomatic tensions, there is always the possibility that FCPA enforcement could
strain foreign relations, although to date, this has not occurred. This may be partly
because the FCPA has been in force for nearly 35 years, yet prosecutions have only
developed a significant presence since 2004.
71
Some legal scholars have argued that without significant “buy in” from the
developing world, effective enforcement is less likely. One compelling way for the U.S.
to increase “buy in” is to take a more measured stance on foreign bribery, based on
“persuasion rather than intrusion.” Salbu, supra note 60, at 445 (Salbu suggests there
are “two important benefits to addressing the issue of bribery using persuasive rather
than intrusive measures. First, persuading the world’s nations to adopt and vigorously
implement effective domestic anti-bribery laws avoids legitimate charges of
ethnocentrism. Second, persuasion is less likely to create global dissension than
coercive, extraterritorially applied laws.”). See also Kevin Davis, Does the Globalization
of Anti-corruption Law Help Developing Countries? in INTERNATIONAL LAW, ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 283 (Julio Faundez & Celine Tan eds., 2010) (arguing
that if the United States can help other nations to develop their own anti-bribery laws,
developing countries would not rely solely on the U.S. and neglect their own
institutions).
69
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the 1998 amendments led to a surge in both corporate and
individual prosecutions, but rarely have cases gone to trial.72 This
“culture of settlement” reinforces the role of federal prosecutors as
the sole interpreters of the FCPA’s statutory language—especially as
it concerns the jurisdiction of individual defendants. Prosecutors
expect that individual defendants will settle, partly because
defendants cannot look to precedent as a means by which to
evaluate the risk of a trial. The statutory modification proposed by
this Note is a means by which to clarify the liability of foreign
nationals. Part II.A explores the major vehicles for corporate
settlement—pleas, non-prosecution agreements, and deferred
prosecution agreements. Part II.B examines notable cases of
prosecutorial over-reaching on jurisdictional issues. Part II.C
surveys the effect of the “culture of settlement” on individual
prosecutions and re-examines possible outcomes for cases in light
of the proposed statutory reform.
A. A Source of the Problem: Corporate Pleas, NPAs, and DPAs
The expansion of the FCPA’s jurisdictional reach resulted in
large settlements with multinational corporations. In 2008, the
largest fine in the history of the FCPA was leveled against Siemens
AG Corporation after a joint investigation by American and German
authorities.73 The DOJ and SEC conducted parallel prosecutions of
Siemens, charging the company with violations of the FCPA’s
accounting provisions.74 Siemens and its affiliates pleaded guilty to
the charges, eventually settling for $800 million.75 Siemens also
72
Another crucial trend not addressed in this paper concerns the impact of
accounting legislation, namely the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, on the self-reporting
of corporate FCPA violations. A number of settlements have come from companies
reporting internal violations through voluntary disclosures. For a general discussion
on the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley and voluntary disclosures on FCPA enforcement, see
Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope of
Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 443 (2009)
(analyzing the role of Sarbanes-Oxley in international bribery enforcement); Robert W.
Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of Justice Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 157 (2010) (discussing
the scope of disclosure required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
73
Leslie Wayne, Foreign Companies Most Affected by a U.S. Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/business/global/bribery-settlementsunder-us-law-are-mostly-with-foreign-countries.html?pagewanted=all.
74
Id.
75
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead
Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html (“In connection with the cases brought by
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settled charges with the Munich Public Prosecutor for €395
million.76
When all the costs were totaled, Siemens paid
approximately $1.6 billion to both American and German
authorities.77
Why would a company accept a fine of that magnitude without
going to trial? The answer lies in the advantages that can be gained
by corporations if they decide to plead guilty. First, a fine can be
considerably greater if a corporation is convicted in a court of law.
In the Siemens case, the U.S. sentencing guidelines actually
recommended a significantly higher fine—up to $2.7 billion—than
the one paid.78 Second, bad press and possible stock devaluation
can follow a lengthy FCPA proceeding,79 an outcome especially
devastating for public corporations that are directly responsible to
their shareholders.80 Legal scholars note that corporations are faced
with a “Hobson’s Choice“ to either accept the DOJ’s charges or
confront the negative media that accompanies a bribery trial.81 Even
though the prosecutor’s legal arguments may be untested,
corporations have strong incentives to accept a plea deal.82
As FCPA prosecutions have increased, so have Non-Prosecution
Agreements (“NPAs”) and Deferred Prosecution Agreements
(“DPAs”).83 An NPA is not filed with a court, but is instead privately
negotiated between the accused company and the DOJ. Included in
the Department, the SEC and the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office, Siemens AG will
pay a combined total of more than $1.6 billion in fines, penalties, and disgorgement
of profits, including $800 million to U.S. authorities, making the combined U.S.
penalties the largest monetary sanction ever imposed in an FCPA case since the act was
passed by Congress in 1977.”).
76
Id.
77
Id. See generally 2008 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN PUBLICATIONS (Jan. 5,
2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2008YearEndFCPAUpdate
.aspx.
78
Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Crim. Div., Prepared
Address to the 22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, at 4 (Nov.
17, 2009) available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/111709
breuerremarks.pdf. See also Giudice, supra note 63, at 349 (It is important to note that
the settlement figures could have been significantly larger because the United States
Sentencing Guidelines recommend a criminal fine between $1.35 and $2.7 billion.).
79
Lestelle, supra note 29, at 529.
80
Id.
81
Justin Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluating and
Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 287 (2007).
82
Koehler, supra note 4, at 940.
83
David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution,
and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 471, 508 (2009).
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the agreement are the company’s acknowledgement of its FCPA
violations and the compliance measures to be implemented in the
future. 84 A DPA is also privately negotiated, although it is formally
filed with a court and resembles a pleading. The DOJ agrees to defer
prosecution of the company, usually for a two- to four-year period,
while the company agrees to implement a series of compliance
measures.85
NPAs and DPAs have begun to predominate in many different
areas of criminal wrongdoing, signaling changing trends in DOJ
enforcement.86 The DOJ currently wields significant power in
dictating the terms of these various agreements. As a result of NPAs
and DPAs, companies can avoid the harshest consequences of
prosecution, including debarment and suspension from
government contracts.87 Public corporations choose agreements
over trials in the hope of evading public disputes over finances and
allegations that might damage stock prices and shareholder
confidence.88 Although the NPAs, DPAs, and compliance
agreements might “preserve the financial viability of a corporation”
in the short term, they also increase regulatory uncertainty and the
costs of doing business abroad in the long term.89
Since plea agreements and alternative resolution vehicles like
84
Koehler, supra note 4, at 934 (“These agreements often take the form of letter
agreements from the DOJ to the entity’s lawyer and generally include a brief—often
times bare-bones—statement of facts replete with legal conclusions that the entity
acknowledges responsibility for, as well as a host of compliance undertakings that the
entity agrees to implement.”).
85
Id. (“A DPA, on the other hand, is filed with a court and thus has a ‘look and
feel’ much like a pleading, although the factual allegations also are often bare-bones
and replete with legal conclusions . . . . There is very little difference between an NPA
and a DPA.”).
86
Id. (“Across all DOJ investigations—not just those under the FCPA—the number
of settlements between defendants and the DOJ has grown substantially since 2002.
From 2002 through 2005 the number of NPAs and DPAs exceeded the total number
that the DOJ entered into in the ten years previous, and FCPA enforcement has been
no exception.”). See also Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of
Authority: The Department of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 1–
3 (2006).
87
Giudice, supra note 63, at 360. See also Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate
Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271, 278–82 (2008).
88
Id. at 157.
89
Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred And NonProsecution Agreements Impede The Full Development Of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y. 137, 138 (2010) (arguing that “[w]hile these agreements provide
several short-term benefits, the long-term consequences of these agreements perpetuate
ambiguities surrounding enforcement of the FCPA. . . . An efficient solution to the
FCPA’s ambiguity problem would be a legislative fix that clarifies the uncertainties
surrounding the Act while preserving deferred and non-prosecution agreements.”).
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NPAs and DPAs have become the dominant means of settling FCPA
investigations, there is a marked absence of case law in FCPA-related
litigation.90 The lack of case law and judicial scrutiny of alternative
methods of resolution has serious consequences for corporations in
assessing their own potential risk of liability.91 NPAs and DPAs do
not act as binding legal precedent for a court92 and there is little to
no judicial scrutiny of these methods of settlement.93 Since an NPA
is not filed with a court, there is no “independent review” of the
agreement made between the DOJ and the accused company. It is
very difficult to gain insight into past prosecutions because NPAs
and DPAs are not made public.94 Enforcement agencies issue press
releases about settlements, but these are often little more than brief
announcements and do not contain crucial information about the
negotiations.95 In certain cases, NPAs and DPAs are offered to
companies even before the prosecution has satisfied any burden of
proving a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.96 Additionally, no
court has ever rejected an NPA or DPA, largely because the accused
enters into the agreement willingly to minimize the risk of further
legal punishment.97 Case law would also be helpful in establishing
compliance programs and developing defense strategy at trial, but
there are no such precedents.98
90

Koehler, supra note 4, at 999–1000 (“Although FCPA resolution vehicles are not
legal precedent, and although they do not necessarily represent the triumph of one
party’s legal position over the other, the unfortunate reality in the FCPA context is that
they do serve as de facto case law”).
91
Id. at 999 (“Against the backdrop of a largely vague and ambiguous statute and
a dearth of substantive FCPA case law, the gap is filled with the resolution vehicles
typically used to resolve FCPA enforcement actions.”).
92
Brooks, supra note 89, at 159 (“The DOJ’s use of DPAs and NPAs directly affects
the development of case law under the FCPA because relevant precedent cannot
develop from settling disputes outside the courtroom. American law depends, in part,
on the judicial application of stare decisis.”). See also Vega, supra note 72, at 443 (“In
addition, deferred prosecution agreements, nonprosecution agreements, and guilty
pleas do not create binding precedent like a decision in a court of law.”).
93
Koehler, supra note 4, at 935 (“Because an NPA is not filed with a court, there is
absolutely no judicial scrutiny of these agreements, including the statement of facts
and legal conclusions that serve as the foundation of the agreement. In other words,
there is no independent review of the statement of facts to determine if evidence exists
to support the essential elements of the crime ‘alleged’ or to determine whether valid
and legitimate defenses are relevant to the ‘alleged’ conduct.”).
94
Id. at 934–35. See also Brooks, supra note 89, at 139.
95
See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashely, Federal Organizational
Prosecution Agreements, U. VA. SCH. L., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution
_agreements/ (last updated Jun. 7, 2011) (listing several examples of various NPAs).
96
Id.
97
Id. (All NPAs and DPAs “have been approved without judicial modification.”).
98
Brooks, supra note 89, at 161. (“DPAs and NPAs subvert this process by
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B. Unilateral Prosecutorial Interpretation of Jurisdiction
A number of corporate cases have raised serious questions
about the “culture of settlement” and prosecutors’ interpretation of
the FCPA’s jurisdictional scope. In February 2007, the DOJ
announced that three U.K.-based subsidiaries of Vetco
International, an oil and natural gas equipment company, pleaded
guilty to violating the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA under §
78dd-3.99 One of the Vetco subsidiaries, headquartered in Houston,
allegedly coordinated the transfer of $2 million in bribes to a
Nigerian customs official. Jurisdiction was premised on the fact that
the subsidiary’s employees used internet communication based in
Houston to further the bribery scheme.100 Vetco, like other
corporations, decided to settle its case.101 Commentators speculated
that if the case had gone to trial, the prosecutor’s interpretation of
jurisdiction under the FCPA might have been struck down.102
In May 2005, the FCPA brought an enforcement action against
a Chinese subsidiary of the U.S.-based Diagnostic Products
Corporation (“DPC”).103 The DOJ alleged that DPC had paid
approximately $1.6 million in bribes to doctors and laboratory
personnel employed by state-owned hospitals in China.104 In
exchange for the bribes, which were paid between 1991 and 2002,
hospital employees agreed to buy products manufactured by
DPC.105 Specifically, it was alleged that DPC “made cash payments
to laboratory personnel and physicians employed in certain
hospitals . . . in exchange for agreements that the hospitals would
obtain [DPC’s products and services].”106 The plea agreement stated
that jurisdiction was based on the premise that the Chinese
preventing courts from analyzing legal and factual issues and subsequently publishing
judgments defining specific points of law related to the FCPA—the very process that is
the essence of developing precedent.”).
99
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Vetco International Ltd. Subsidiaries
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Agree to Pay $26 Million in Criminal Fines (Feb.
6, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/February/07_crm_075.html
[hereinafter “Vetco Press Release”].
100
Lestelle, supra note 29, at 537.
101
Vetco Press Release, supra note 99. The plea was filed with the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
102
Vetco Press Release, supra note 99.
103
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, DPC (Tianjin) LTD. Charged with Violating
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (May 20, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2005/May/05_crm_282.htm.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
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subsidiary of DPC was acting as an agent of the U.S. parent company
and was therefore liable under the FCPA as a “domestic concern.”
107
The prosecutor defined the doctors and hospital employees to be
“foreign officials,” another assumption that was never challenged in
court.
The DPC case is an excellent example of the type of
prosecutorial discretion that is used to interpret the jurisdictional
language of the FCPA on a unilateral basis.108 Because DPC chose
to plead guilty to the charges, rather than take the case to trial, there
was no judicial scrutiny of whether prosecutors overstepped the
jurisdictional bounds of the FCPA.109 In fact, one of the few FCPA
cases with judicial scrutiny suggests that allowing “agent liability”
for foreign subsidiaries is not in accordance with the legislative
intent of Congress.110 Unlike the Vetco case, in which the subsidiary
was headquartered in the United States, the DPC subsidiary was
located in China where the corrupt activity occurred. There was no
participation by the U.S.-based operations of DPC.
The 1998 amendments state that foreign nationals and
corporations can be liable under the FCPA as long as activity
furthering the corrupt payment occurred “while in the territory of
the United States.”111 Legal scholars interpret the language of the
FCPA and its legislative history to indicate that the FCPA should be
limited to acts committed in the United States.112 Yet both Vetco
and DPC decided to settle, and the prosecutorial scope was never
subjected to review.

107

Lestelle, supra note 29, at 537.
Marceau, supra note 81, at 294 (“The DPC enforcement action is perhaps the
clearest example of the willingness of federal prosecutors to pursue criminal charges in
cases where either jurisdiction, or liability, or both, is anything but obvious. That is to
say, DPC is indicative of a growing body of enforcement actions featuring federal
prosecutors willing to expend resources investigating and prosecuting corruption cases
where the statutory authority for such prosecutions is, at best, strained”).
109
Marceau, supra note 81, at 294.
110
Marceau, supra note 81, at 295 (“Indeed, courts had concluded that permitting
foreign subsidiary liability under the provisions of the FCPA allowing for ‘agent’
liability contravened the clear legislative history on the question of foreign entity
liability. Congress had specifically considered extending liability to foreign entities and
declined to do so.”).
111
FCPA of 1998, supra note 38, § 78dd-2.
112
Marceau, supra note 81, at 294–95. (“It is clear from both the plain text of
amendments, and the legislative history that the exercise of independent jurisdiction
over a foreign entity was limited to those situations where the foreign entity committed
an act in furtherance of the bribe while in the United States.”).
108
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C. Uneven Outcomes for Prosecutions of Foreign Nationals
From the court’s perspective, judges also have little precedent
to use at trial. One of the most important functions of the
separation of powers is that judges can signal to legislators when
legal gaps in statutes exist.113 In United States v. Kozeny, U.S. District
Judge Shira Scheindlin, who sits in the Southern District of New
York, became one of the few judges to preside over an FCPA trial.114
In issuing her opinion, Scheindlin noted that there were
“surprisingly few decisions throughout the country on the FCPA
over the course of the last thirty years.”115 Since courts rely on the
principle of stare decisis to establish the parameters of legal conduct,
lack of precedent is a serious obstacle to interpretation. Companies
often accept the enforcement agencies’ statutory interpretations
because they are unable to confirm if a court of law would agree.116
Ambiguities in the language of the FCPA and the dearth of
precedent have made it difficult for individuals, like corporations,
to weigh the risks of trial. Between 2005 and 2011, the DOJ charged
79 individuals with FCPA offenses, with the majority of charges
occurring since 2008.117 Both American citizens and foreigners are
subject to prosecution. Prosecutors have broadly interpreted section
78dd-3 to pursue foreign actors whose bribery has merely had some
“effect” on business with the United States. 118 A study found that
sixty-two percent of DOJ cases charging individual criminal
defendants with foreign bribery schemes in violation of the FCPA
were resolved by guilty pleas.119
The difference in sentencing outcomes in the prosecution of the
following three individuals—all foreigners—shows the effect of the
“culture of settlement.” The cases show that the severity of penalty
corresponded to a defendant’s willingness to accept the charges of
the prosecutor.
113

Brooks, supra note 89, at 160.
U.S. v. Kozeny, 493 F.Supp. 2d 693, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
115
Id.
116
Vega, supra note 72, at 443 (“Early settlement means similarly situated
individuals and corporate defendants never get the opportunity to see if a court agrees
with the regulators’ reading of the statute.”).
117
Mike Koehler, Individual DOJ Prosecutions by the Numbers, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept.
20,
2011),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/individual-doj-prosecutions-by-thenumbers (noting that 1 individual was prosecuted in 2005, 6 individuals in 2006, 8
individuals in 2007, 12 individuals in 2008, 19 individuals in 2009, and 31 individuals
in 2010, including 22 in Africa Sting Case).
118
Lestelle, supra note 29, at 536.
119
2008 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN PUBLICATIONS (July 7, 2008),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/2008 Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx.
114
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Jeffrey Tesler was a British and Israeli citizen charged with
facilitating corrupt conduct involving the large-scale, systematic
bribery of Nigerian officials in exchange for engineering,
procurement, and construction contracts at Bonny Island.120 Tesler
was charged under the FCPA on the basis of alleged emails that
passed through American servers and money transferred through
American bank accounts. The briberies lasted over ten years and the
contracts were valued at more than $6 billion.121 Tesler chose to
accept a plea and received 21 months in prison and two years
supervised release.122
Canadian citizen Ousama Namaan was a former agent for
global chemical manufacturer Innospec, a lead player in contract
negotiations with the U.N. Oil for Food Program.123 Between 2004
and 2008, Naaman was charged with offering more than $6.8
million in bribes to Iraqi officials, earning himself $2.7 million in
commission on the contracts.124 The company pleaded guilty to
wire fraud charges as well as violating the FCPA.125 Naaman also
pled guilty, and was sentenced to 30 months in prison and ordered
to pay a $250,000 fine.126 Although Naaman was not a U.S. citizen,
the DOJ held that Naaman’s actions fell within the scope of sections
78dd-1 and 78dd-3, since he sent emails concerning bribe payments
through U.S. servers, and also sent improper payments through U.S.
120
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Two UK Citizens Charged by United States with
Bribing Nigerian Government Officials to Obtain Lucrative Contract as Part of KBR
Joint Venture Scheme (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
pr/press_releases/2009/03/03-05-09tesler-charge.pdf; Mike Koehler, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389,
405 (2010).
121
Wayne, supra note 73.
122
Laura Brubaker Calkins, Ex-KBR CEO Stanley Gets 2 1/2 Years in Prison for Foreign
Bribes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/201202-23/ex-kbr-ceo-albert-stanley-gets-30-month-prison-term-in-nigeria-bribe-case
(Albert “Jack” Stanley, an American citizen and former KBR CEO, was sentenced to 60
months in prison in addition to forfeiting an illicitly-gained sum of $10.8 million.
Wojciech Chodan, a former sales officer at KBR’s UK subsidiary, was sentenced to 1
year of probation and a $20,000 fine. The cooperation of the three men led to eight
felony pleas, four Deferred-Prosecution agreements, and a total of $1.7 billion in
penalties.).
123
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Innospec Agent Pleads Guilty to Bribing Iraqi
Officials and Paying Kickbacks Under the Oil for Food Program (June 25, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-crm-747.html.
124
Id.
125
Christopher M. Matthews, Judge Sentences Former Innospec Agent To 30 Months,
WALL ST. J. BLOG (Dec. 22 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/12/22
/judge-sentences-former-innospec-agent-to-30-months/.
126
Id.
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bank accounts.127
Joel Esquenazi was president of Terra Communications, based
in Miami, Florida. Esquenazi was charged with paying $890,000 in
bribes to shell companies, which then transferred the money to
Communications D’Haiti (“Haiti Teleco”).128 In exchange for the
bribes,
Terra
Communications
received
preferred
telecommunications rates from Haiti Teleco. Esquenazi refused to
accept a plea deal and defended his innocence at trial.129 Esquenazi
was convicted by a jury of FCPA violations130 and was sentenced to
fifteen years in prison—the longest criminal sentence ever handed
down in an FCPA case.131
All three prosecutions reflect the growing willingness of the
DOJ to prosecute individuals, including non-U.S. nationals, for
business activity occurring primarily abroad.132 The sentences also
show a considerable variation in outcome. Jeffrey Tesler and
Ousamaa Namaan both accepted plea agreements and received 21
and 30 months in prison, respectively. Esquenazi, however, made
the decision to go to trial and received 15 years. But the Bonny
Island bribery scheme and the Oil for Food Scandal were much
larger in scope than the incident concerning Haiti Telecom. Bonny
Island involved nearly $6 billion-worth of bribes; Oil for Food
127

Koehler, supra note 4, at 405.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for
Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company in Haiti (Oct.
25, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-crm-1407.html.
129
Mike Koehler, Testing Innocence, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 27 2012), http://
www.fcpaprofessor.com/testing-innocence.
130
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 128 (A jury trial was brought before
Judge Jose Martinez in the Southern District of Florida. The jury ultimately returned a
guilty verdict on one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and wire fraud, seven
counts of FCPA violations, one count of money laundering conspiracy, and twelve
counts of money laundering).
131
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 128 (Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney
General: “This sentence – the longest sentence ever imposed in an FCPA case – is a stark
reminder to executives that bribing government officials to secure business advantages
is a serious crime with serious consequence.”). Prior to Judge Martinez’s sentence, the
longest FCPA sentence was handed down to Charles Jumet in 2010. Jumet’s sentence
was 87 months. Mike Scarcella, 87-Month Prison Longest Ever in FCPA Prosecution, BLOG
LEGAL TIMES (Apr. 19, 2010), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/04/87monthprison-sentence-longest-ever-in-fcpa-prosecution.html.
132
Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 759
(2011) (“The recently unsealed indictment of Ousama Naaman under provides an
example of the enforcement agencies’ use of the FCPA’s expansive jurisdiction to reach
non-U.S. nationals acting outside of the United States as agents of a U.S. issuer.
Importantly, recent FCPA enforcement actions demonstrate the DOJ’s willingness to
prosecute U.S. companies and executives for business activity occurring entirely abroad
despite U.S.-based personnel’s lack of knowledge and participation.”).
128
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involved $6.8 million; and Haiti Teleco involved only $890,000.
Tesler and Namaan received much shorter sentences for conduct
that was more widespread and harmful.133
These sentences were so wildly divergent because Tesler and
Namaan were willing to settle with the DOJ, while Esquenazi “tested
[his] innocence.”134 Cooperating in order to receive a lighter penalty
is often a wise move, especially for FCPA violations.135 Although
plea bargaining can result in a lighter penalty than one imposed at
trial,136 the unique circumstances created by FCPA enforcement
make pleas the accepted standard in individual prosecutions. The
pervasive “culture of settlement” allowed the FCPA’s vague language
to go unchallenged, a weakness that would prove problematic once
subject to the rigors of the courtroom and judicial review.
As it stands, the DOJ can use the ambiguities of the FCPA to
indict foreigners merely because some act associated with bribery—
whether legal or illegal—”took place in the territory of the United
States.”137 Tweaking the language of section 78dd-3 could impact
individual prosecutions by giving foreign defendants clear notice of
the legality of their acts, whether in the United States or abroad.
Although this change to statutory language will not resolve all the
FCPA’s issues of jurisdiction, the lack of judicial review, or the
“culture of settlement,” it can clarify expectations for foreign
defendants charged under the FCPA who are willing to take their
cases to trial. And as the Africa Sting cases show, sometimes foreign
defendants are willing to take this risk and force the court to
confront ambiguity in the statute.

133

Koehler, supra note 4.
Id.
135
Ellen Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2010) (“Our existing legal system places the risk of going
to trial, and in some cases even being charged with a crime so high, that innocence and
guilt no longer become the real considerations . . . [rather,] maneuvering the system to
receive the least onerous consequences may ensure the best result for the accused party,
regardless of innocence.”).
136
Id.
137
Mike Koehler, A Q&A With Homer Moyer, Partner at Miller Chevalier, FCPA
PROFESSOR (May 24, 2011), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/05/q-withhomer-moyer.html (Moyer argues that narrowing the jurisdiction of the FCPA can be
considered an important priority: “To be sure, in enforcing the FCPA, the government
tries to overreach from time to time—exercising anti-bribery jurisdiction over foreign
subsidiaries and aggressive applications of dd-3 jurisdictional on the grounds that
some step in the process took place “in the territory of the United States” come to mind
as occasional examples”).
134

REDIKER FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

2/5/2016 8:40 PM

77

IV. THE AFRICA STING TRIALS AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Past prosecutions of individuals have shown that there are
strong benefits to accepting a plea agreement—and thus, to
accepting prosecutorial interpretation of the FCPA. But what
happened when the FCPA was exposed to comprehensive judicial
review in trial? The Africa Sting Trials have been, to date, one of the
only examples of a court’s examination of the FCPA’s jurisdictional
scope, and they exposed ambiguities in the law and its enforcement.
Section III.A will provide background on the Africa Sting Trials.
Section III.B examines the first two trials, which offered conclusive
rulings on the admissibility of evidence and jurisdiction of the
FCPA. Section III.C analyzes the first ever ruling on section 78dd-3
of the FCPA. Section III.D proposes a modification of statutory
language of section 78dd-3 that would restrict the jurisdiction of the
FCPA in light of the Africa Sting decision.
A. Background of the Africa Sting Trials
The Africa Sting operations began when FBI agents posing as
Gabonese government officials allegedly enticed executives in the
defense contracting industry to participate in a bribery scheme.
According to the FBI plan, the executives would pay a $1.5 million
bribe to the Gabonese defense minister in exchange for a $15
million contract to provide body armor, weapons, and military gear
to Gabon’s National Guard.138 No officials from Gabon were
actually involved.139 The primary sting operation was carried out at
a trade gathering in Las Vegas, where federal agents arrested a total
of twenty one businesspeople, mostly owners and executives of
military-equipment companies.140 Approximately 150 FBI agents
138

Christopher Matthews & Joe Palazzalo, Jury Clears Two Businessmen in ‘Sting’ Case
on Bribery, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052
970203920204577193322932194432.html.
139
Id. The increasing frequency of FCPA prosecutions involving Africa is
noteworthy. In 2008 and 2009, DOJ received nearly $579 million in disgorgement
penalties and fines for acts of bribery with foreign officials in Africa. The figures on the
scope of Africa’s economic loss due to corruption are staggering. Africa loses an
estimated $148 billion annually—25% of the continent’s gross domestic product—
through corruption. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Change or the Illusion of Change: The War
Against Official Corruption in Africa, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 697, 728 (2006). A
2002 study by the African Union estimated that corruption costs the continent $150
billion per year. Reagan Demas, Moment Of Truth: Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Critical Alterations Needed in Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other
Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 315, 322 (2011).
140
Mayer Brown, Legal Update, FCPA Sting Operation: 22 Arrested in US; Search
Warrants Executed Simultaneously in US and UK (January 21, 2010), http://
www.mayerbrown.com/publications/FCPA-Sting-Operation-22-Arrested-in-US-

REDIKER FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

78

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

2/5/2016 8:40 PM

[Vol. 40:1

compiled evidence, which included more than 5,000 taped phone
calls, more than 800 hours of video and audio recordings, and 231
recordings of meetings between undercover agents and the
defendants.141 The DOJ called the Africa Sting Case “the largest
single investigation and prosecution against individuals in the
history of DOJ’s enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.”142 After the defendants were indicted by a grand jury, three
pleaded guilty; but the remainder refused to plead or settle. The case
was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
and the defendants were split into four groups for trial.143
B. The Africa Sting Trials
The first trial began in the summer of 2011. Twelve jurors from
Washington D.C. were asked to determine the guilt of Pankesh
Patel, John Benson Wier III, Andrew Bigelow, and Lee Allen
Tolleson. These defendants, a diverse group of businesspeople in
the arms industry, both U.S. citizens and foreigners, were charged
with conspiracy to violate the FCPA, conspiracy to engage in money
laundering, and substantive violations of the FCPA.144 From the
start, there were discouraging signs for the prosecution. The chief
witness in the trial was Richard Bistrong, who introduced the FBI
sting team to a number of the defendants. Bistrong had serious
credibility problems because he had pleaded guilty—on unrelated
charges—to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA in
September of 2009. In the hope of receiving a lighter sentence,
Bistrong helped to orchestrate the sting and implicate the
defendants in a corrupt weapons deal.145 Explicit text messages
between Bistrong and FBI handlers surfaced during the trial,
suggesting that FBI agents had difficulties establishing appropriate
boundaries with Bistrong.146 The presiding judge, Richard Leon,
Search-Warrants-Executed-Simultaneously-in-US-and-UK-01-21-2010/.
141
Richard Cassin, DOJ Ends Africa Sting Prosecution, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 12, 2012,
1:28
PM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/21/doj-ends-africa-stingprosecution.html.
142
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of Military
and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Jan.
19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/twenty-two-executives-andemployees-military-and-law-enforcement-products-companies-charged.
143
Dan Margolies & Jeremy Pelofsky, US Judge Doubts Single Conspiracy in Bribery
Case, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2010, 6:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ article/2010/02/17
/arms-bribery-idUSN1715506120100217?type=marketsNews.
144
Dep’t of Justice, supra note 142.
145
Cassin, supra note 141.
146
Paul Friedman & Demme Doufekias, Most Severe Setback To DOJ Thus Far in

REDIKER FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

2/5/2016 8:40 PM

79

believed the conspiratorial link between the defendants was
tenuous. At a preliminary hearing, Judge Leon asserted: “I read all
sixteen indictments, and I didn’t see it. I have zero sense that there
was an omnibus grand conspiracy.”147
The prosecution also faced difficulty with its presentation of
evidence at trial. The prosecution possessed video and audiotapes
showing some of the defendants actively bribing actual foreign
officials.148 The prosecution argued that this evidence should be
admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to demonstrate the
defendants’ knowledge and intent. This evidence would have
shown that these defendants were “predisposed” to commit the
crime and were not “manipulated” by the government informant.149
Judge Leon deemed the evidence detailing “prior bad acts”
inadmissible, including past schemes to make bribery payments for
weapon contracts. Critics claimed that the government exercised
little restraint in the type and quantity of evidence they sought to
admit under Rule 404(b).150 Critics also noted that the government
cast too wide a net, selecting defendants without carefully ensuring
that they had the requisite “predisposition” to commit the particular
crime.151
After excluding crucial evidence from trial, Judge Leon ordered
what is believed to be the first-ever judicial ruling on the
jurisdictional scope of § 78dd-3 of the FCPA.152 Prong 3 in § 78dd
was added to the statute as part of the 1998 amendments. It applied
to ‘‘persons other than issuers or domestic concerns’’ and required
that an individual, “while in the territory” of the United States, make
use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
FCPA Prosecutions: Judge Dismisses All Charges in Africa Sting Case, MONDAQ (February
27, 2012), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/166392/White+Collar+Crime+
Fraud/Most+Severe+Setback+To+DOJ+Thus+Far+In+FCPA+Prosecutions+Judge+Dis
misses+All+Charges+In+Africa+Sting+Case.
147
Margolies & Pelofsky, supra note 143.
148
Eric Bruce, Matthew Menchel & David McGill, Inside the Africa Sting Trial:
Anatomy of a Failed Prosecution, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 23, 2012), http://
www.fcpaprofessor.com/category/fcpa-trials.
149
Michael Volkov, Lessons Learned from the Africa Sting Case, Corruption Crime
Compliance, VOLKOV LAW GROUP (Apr. 18, 2012), http://blog.volkovlaw.com/2012/04/
lessons-learned-from-the-africa-sting-case/.
150
Bruce et al., supra note 148 (“Seeking to admit such a wide range of prior bad
acts evidence pertaining to deals outside the U.S. was, in our view, a strategic misstep
by the government.”).
151
Bruce et al., supra note 148.
152
Mike Koehler, 2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Year in Review: Scrutiny, Reform,
and Individual Prosecutions are Key Issues, WHITE COLLAR CRIME REPORT (Jan. 27, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992616.
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commerce or do any other act in furtherance of a bribery scheme.153
Defendant Pankesh Patel, a British citizen and executive at a
weapons marketing firm, filed a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 acquittal motion
to strike the FCPA charge premised on his dispatch of a package—
containing the purchase agreement in furtherance of the alleged
corrupt scheme—from the United Kingdom to the United States.
The court granted this motion and dismissed the charge, calling the
DOJ’s jurisdictional support “novel” and lacking in precedent.154
The prosecution also faced difficulties relating to its selection of
court.155 Commentators have suggested that it might have been
more advantageous to the prosecution to bring the case to trial in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, whose
juries have a more conservative reputation.156 The first trial ended
when the jury deadlocked, and Judge Leon declared a mistrial as to
all remaining counts against Patel, Bigelow, Wier, and Tolleson.157
The second trial began several months later in September of
2011. The second group of defendants was R. Patrick Caldwell,
John Mushriqui, Jeana Mushriqui, John Godsey, and Marc
Morales.158 The DOJ was determined to proceed with the case, but
once again, had difficulty proving the elements of conspiracy. Judge
Leon dismissed the conspiracy counts, noting that most of the
evidence indicated that the defendants had not met or spoken with
each other.159 The jury was again skeptical about the credibility of
Richard Bistrong.160 This skepticism led the jury to acquit two
defendants and deadlock on charges against the remaining three.
Judge Leon declared a mistrial for the second time. In dismissing
the indictments, he specifically referenced the “government’s very,
very aggressive conspiracy theory,” which, “in the second trial . . .
snapped in the absence of the necessary evidence to sustain it.”161
153

FCPA of 1998, supra note 38, at § 78dd-3(a).
Koehler, supra note 152, at 6.
155
Volkov, supra note 149 (“Any federal prosecutor who worked in the District of
Columbia knows one thing – undercover “stings” are extremely difficult and
unpopular in front of DC juries. . .”).
156
Volkov, supra note 149.
157
Bruce et al., supra note 148.
158
Richard Cassin, Africa String Trial: After Partial Verdict, Judge Sends Jury Back,
FCPA BLOG (Jan. 24, 2012, 2:30PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/1/24/
africa-sting-trial-after-partial-verdict-judge-sends-jury-ba.html#.
159
Id.
160
Friedman & Doufekias, supra note 146 (The explicit text messages sent between
Bistrong and the FBI prompted the foreman of the jury to comment publicly that the
jury found the government’s witnesses to have little credibility.).
161
Friedman & Doufekias, supra note 146.
154
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In short, the state failed to prove conspiracy, relied on an
untrustworthy witness, and presented the FBI agents in a poor
light.162
C. Lessons Learned About Prosecutorial Discretion and
Jurisdiction
The third trial was slated to begin in March 2012, but, in
February, the DOJ dropped the FCPA charges against the remaining
defendants, and even dismissed the counts against the three
individuals who had pleaded guilty.163 The DOJ explained that,
given the outcomes of the first two trials, the inadmissibility of
evidence under Rule 404(b), and the large expenditure of public
resources, it was not in the interest of the U.S. government to
continue the trial.164 Judge Leon offered perhaps the best summary
of the Africa Sting Trials: “This appears to be the end of a long and
sad chapter of white-collar criminal enforcement.”165
The Africa Sting Trials are excellent examples of prosecutors’
overconfidence regarding the outcomes of investigations before
they happen. Eric Dubelier, a partner at Reed Smith and counsel to
R. Patrick Caldwell in the second Africa Sting Trial, made two
significant observations about the trial.166 First, he noted that many
of the problems were based in the sting operation itself, since the
jury never heard the defendants formally agree to be involved in a
162
Mike Koehler, Africa Sting – A “Long and Sad Chapter in the Annals of White Collar
Criminal Enforcement, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Feb. 23, 2012), http://
www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/africa-sting-a-long-and-sad-chapter-in-theannals-of-white-collar-criminal-enforcement/. (Michael Madigan, defense counsel in
the second Africa sting trial, pithily summarized the weaknesses of the prosecution,
noting that the DOJ was hamstrung by its “choice of a snitch (a despicable, dishonest
30-year cocaine addict and admitted thief of millions of dollars hidden in Swiss bank
accounts from his prior employer), the ‘it’s all just a game’ commentary from the agents
who disrespected the rule of law, and the structuring of the ‘sting’ in its documents and
taped conversations to make the Defendants think it was a legal transaction they were
being asked to participate in. . . .”).
163
CM Matthews, Justice Dept. Drops FCPA Sting Case, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 21,
2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/02/21/justice-dept-drops-fcpa-sting-case/.
164
Pl’s. Mot. to Dismiss, at 3, U.S. v. Goncalves, (2008) (Criminal No. 09-335). Mot.
to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a), U.S. v. Goncalves, (2012) Criminal No.
09-335). See also Leslie Wayne, Bribery Case Falls Apart, and Tactics are Doubted, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/business/ fbi-briberycase-falls-apart-and-raises-questions.html?_r=0 (The DOJ also pointed to the fact that
its key informant, Richard Bistrong, admitted to using cocaine and hiring prostitutes.).
165
Leslie Wayne, Bribery Case Falls Apart, and Tactics are Doubted, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/business/fbi-bribery-case-falls-apartand-raises-questions.html?_r=0.
166
Telephone Interview with Eric Dubelier, Partner, Reed Smith (Oct. 19, 2012).
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crime.167 According to Dubelier, the failure of the Africa Sting Trials
should motivate the government to change its tactics for future
stings by being more careful and explicit when collecting evidence
for trial.168 Second, Dubelier stated that the prevailing practice of
corporate settlement and voluntary disclosures affected the attitude
of federal prosecutors.169 In the Africa Sting Trials, the government
was quite inflexible in terms of what it offered the defendants.
Dubelier noted that “[t]he only deal they were offering was jail.
There was no downside to trying the case.”170 Individuals charged
under the FCPA may find the prospect of trial more appealing now,
especially when conspiracy cannot be proven and the jurisdictional
link is tenuous.171 Dubelier explained, “[t]he major problem in the
Africa Sting Trials was that the government thought that everyone
was going to plead guilty. . . . There has been a mindset in the [DOJ]
Fraud Section that these individual prosecutions will all settle.”172
When defendants decided to contest the charges in court, the
government was not adequately prepared to try the case.
Most importantly, Judge Leon refused to accept the DOJ’s
claims for jurisdiction and provided the first ruling to ever interpret
section 78dd-3. Judge Leon ruled that the purchase agreement, sent
by Pankesh Patel through the mail, did not qualify as a jurisdictional
hook under section 78dd-3 of the FCPA.173 Patel was a citizen of
the United Kingdom and director of a British company that acted as
a sales agent for companies in the military products industry.174
Patel had flown from the United Kingdom to the United States,
where he met with a fictitious official and received a purchase
agreement. He then returned to the United Kingdom and sent a
package, which contained the purchase agreement, via DHL back to
the United States. The DOJ charged Patel under section 78dd-3 as
“a ‘person’ other than an issuer or a domestic concern” who had,
while in the territory of the United States, corruptly made use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to
167

Id.
Id.
169
Id. (“The government has been riding a wave of voluntary disclosures and
corporate settlements.”).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Telephone Interview with Eric Dubelier, Partner, Reed Smith (Oct. 19, 2012).
173
Mike Koehler, Significant dd-3 Development in Africa Sting Case, FCPA PROFESSOR
(June 9, 2011, 12:08 EST), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/06/ significant-dd3-development-in-africa.html.
174
Id.
168
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do any other act in furtherance of an offer, payment, etc.175
One question before the Court was whether Patel had
committed an illegal act by mailing the package from the United
Kingdom. Patel’s attorney, Eric Bruce, argued that, according to the
provisions of section 78dd-3, Patel could only be charged for illegal
activity that he committed in the United States. Bruce stated, “[h]e’s
a U.K. citizen, operating a U.K. company, he’s not a domestic
concern under the statute, he can only be liable under the FCPA
statute for conduct ‘while in the territory of the United States.’ And
that’s required by statute. That’s their sort of jurisdictional hook on
him.”176 Bruce maintained that Patel had done nothing illegal in
the United States. He had completed the corrupt deal only from the
United Kingdom. Bruce explained, “[s]o literally they’ve charged
him with being in London and dropping a DHL package in the mail
as a substantive FCPA violation, while the statute very clearly
requires that he can only be liable for something while in the
territory of the United States.”177 According to Bruce’s interpretation
of section 78dd-3, an illegal act had to be taken while a foreigner
was in the United States in order for such person to be charged with
an FCPA violation.
Joseph Lipton (“Lipton”), the DOJ attorney, offered a very
different interpretation. He argued that Patel did not need to
commit an illegal act while in the territory of the United States; he
just needed to commit any act. Lipton explained that Patel, as a U.K.
citizen, “actually has to do less than a U.S. citizen really, because a
U.S. citizen has to make use of the mails or interstate commerce.
And Mr. Patel just has to take an act, any act, while he’s in the United
States. Doesn’t have to be an illegal act, doesn’t have to be anything
related to the deal going forward.”178 Lipton then went on to argue
that although Patel had not done anything illegal in the United
States, his act was part of the bribery scheme. Lipton noted:
He has to take any act in the United States, which he clearly does. First
of all, he flies over from the U.K. to the United States, which we
established through his travel records. And then he meets with the
fictitious official and receives a purchase agreement. He then later takes
that purchase agreement and sends it back.179

175
Indictment at ¶¶ 2, 7, United States v. Patel (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2009) (No. 1:09cr-00338-RJL).
176
Transcript of Record at 7, United States v. Patel (D.D.C., June 6, 2011) (No. 090335).
177
Id. at 7–8 (emphasis added).
178
Id. at 8.
179
Id. at 8–9.
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Lipton claimed, “you don’t have to prove all of the elements of
the offense while he’s in the United States . . . . He just has to take
an act while he’s in the United States. He did take an act.”180
Judge Leon, however, was not comfortable with Lipton’s
reasoning and asked him to clarify the DOJ’s position. Judge Leon
urged:
Help me understand why it doesn’t have to be an act while in the territory
of the United States for Count 3, whereas Count 2 [a substantive FCPA
offense against Patel based on his attendance at a Washington D.C.
meeting to discuss the allegedly corrupt deal], sounds like you admit that
that’s the case in Count 2. In Count 3, I think your rationale is since he’s
already taken one act within the United States, the subsequent act of
mailing doesn’t have to be within the United States, right?181

Lipton replied, “Correct, Judge.”182 Judge Leon, however, did
not accept Lipton’s argument and sought authority for Lipton’s
claim that any act taken within the United States was sufficient to
prove bribery committed outside the United States. The following
exchange ensued:
Judge Leon: Has the Supreme Court said that?
Lipton: Judge, no.
Judge Leon: Has the D.C. Circuit said that?
Lipton: No.
Judge Leon: How about the Second Circuit, where you used to
prosecute?
Lipton: Judge, there’s not a lot of case law on the FCPA, as
Your Honor I think is well aware.
Judge Leon: So is this a novel interpretation you want me to
take?183

The exchange underscored the lack of case law pertaining to the
FCPA.
Judge Leon, unwilling to accept Lipton’s broad
interpretation, noted, “I would think the more cautious,
conservative interpretation would be that each act has to be while
in the territory of the United States, wouldn’t it?”184 Bruce, Patel’s
attorney, then responded to Lipton’s claim as follows:
The statute plainly requires, Your Honor, that while in the territory of the
United States he has to corruptly make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or do any act in furtherance of an
offer, payment, promise to pay or authorization. It’s clear as day.185

Judge Leon, in the first judicial ruling on section 78dd-3,

180

Id. at 9.
Id.
182
Transcript of Record at 10, United States v. Patel (D.D.C., June 6, 2011) (No.
09-0335).
183
Id.
184
Id. at 11.
185
Id.
181
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granted Patel’s motion for acquittal.186
D. Reforming the Language of FCPA Section 78dd-3
In his decision to acquit Patel, Judge Leon substantially
narrowed the jurisdictional hook of section 78dd-3. Judge Leon’s
ruling implied that a defendant charged under this statute must
commit, while in the United States, an illegal act of bribery, not
simply “any act.” Yet Judge Leon only issued an oral decision from
the bench; he did not offer a written interpretation of section 78dd3. The fact that Bruce and Lipton could propose such widely
divergent interpretations of section 78dd-3 suggests that the
language of the statute is still in need of clarification. A slight
modification of the language of section 78dd-3 is needed to
reconcile these varying interpretations. Such a change would be a
small step toward addressing larger problems involving the lack of
judicial review, vague statutory language, and the “culture of
settlement” that results.
In order to be charged under the FCPA, a foreign citizen must
satisfy two conditions: first, he must commit an act while in the
territory of the United States and second, he must “corruptly” make
use of either the U.S. mails or interstate commerce or do any other
act in furtherance of an offer, etc.187 Lipton made a critical mistake
in failing to argue that Patel’s act in the United States, while not
illegal on its own, was in furtherance of the bribery scheme. A
reasonable case could have been made that most bribery schemes
unfold in stages, and that, although Patel’s act in the United States
was not itself illegal, it was “in furtherance” of an illegal scheme.
However, Lipton chose to make a more sweeping argument. Judge
Leon’s exchange with Lipton and his subsequent decision to acquit
Patel suggest that he interpreted the language of section 78dd-3 to
mean that foreigners must commit an illegal act in the U.S in order
to be held in violation of the FCPA.
Yet Judge Leon’s decision does not completely dispel the
reigning confusion. The language “any other act in furtherance of
an offer” still retains unduly wide latitude for interpretation. “In
furtherance” continues to make section 78dd-3 open to future
readings that the act taken does not need to be illegal, but only
needs to further an illegal scheme. This Article suggests that the
language of section 78dd-3 could be clarified to read:
It shall be unlawful for any person other than an issuer or domestic
186
187

Koehler, supra note 173.
FCPA of 1998, supra note 48.
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concern, while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
to do any other corrupt act relating to an offer, payment, promise to pay,
etc.

By removing “in furtherance” and clarifying that “any other act”
must also be corrupt, the statute would make clear that any act in
furtherance of bribery on U.S. soil does not necessarily constitute a
violation of the FCPA. This change would make it possible to
delineate the illegal elements of a bribery scheme that might unfold
in stages, involving both illegal and legal acts. It would provide the
DOJ with a clearer mandate for prosecution and create greater
transparency in the law. Most importantly, it would clarify
jurisdiction and limit the ability of the DOJ to conduct overly broad
prosecutions of foreigners who have committed no illegal acts on
U.S. soil.
Although a small change to statutory language cannot solve the
entire problem involving the FCPA’s vague language on jurisdiction,
the lack of judicial review, and the “culture of settlement,” it can
clarify expectations for foreign defendants charged under the FCPA
who are willing to take their cases to trial. This subtle modification
of the statutory language could impact individual prosecutions—
like those associated with Bonny Island, Oil for Food, and Haiti
Telecom—by giving foreign defendants clear notice regarding the
legality of their acts, whether in the United States or abroad. The
outcomes of the three individual prosecutions discussed above may
not have come out differently as a result of this statutory
modification, but the defendants would undoubtedly have had a
clearer picture of their odds at trial. As it stands, the DOJ can use
the ambiguities of the FCPA to indict foreigners merely because
some act associated with bribery—whether legal or illegal—“took
place in the territory of the United States.”188 This suggested
modification to statutory language would help to clarify jurisdiction
and address problems created by the FCPA’s “culture of settlement.”

188
A Q&A with Homer Moyer, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 24, 2011), http://
www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-qa-with-homer-moyer. (Moyer argues that narrowing the
jurisdiction of the FCPA can be considered an important priority: “To be sure, in
enforcing the FCPA, the government tries to overreach from time to time—exercising
anti-bribery jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries and aggressive applications of dd-3
jurisdictional on the grounds that some step in the process took place ‘in the territory
of the United States’ come to mind as occasional examples.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
Between 1977, when the FCPA was enacted, and 2003, when
the DOJ began to increase prosecutions, almost no cases went to
trial. The FCPA was largely unenforced. After 2003, the DOJ began
to prosecute more vigorously, but almost all cases were resolved
through settlement routes: DPAs, NPAs, and plea agreements. If the
FCPA is to remain a strong tool in combatting bribery, it must be
subject to judicial review. A body of precedent must be established
that both defense and prosecution attorneys can reference. The
language of the act should be clarified. Phrases such as “foreign
official,” “obtaining and retaining business for or with, or directing
business to any person,” and “any other act in furtherance of an
offer” will need further definition through the courts. This Article
suggests one change in language that can serve to make the law
clearer.
The FCPA has successfully spread awareness that corruption is
an unacceptable way of doing business, but it has also overreached
by limiting the right of other countries to regulate their own citizens’
business conduct. As the Supreme Court recognized in Microsoft
Corp v. AT&T Corp.: ‘‘United States law governs domestically but
does not rule the world.’’189 Extraterritorial FCPA enforcement
against foreign companies or individuals for actions taken outside
the United States neglects the Supreme Court’s admonitions and
may also prove short sighted in achieving the ultimate goal of
eliminating corruption and bribery in an increasingly global,
integrated world economy. The state’s loss in the African Sting Trials
may in fact prove to be the law’s gain, encouraging corporations,
individuals, judges, and the DOJ to begin the long overdue process
of judicial review of the FCPA.

189
United States v. Microsoft, 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007). The court refused to
apply U.S. patent law to an infringement based claim based on software code created
in the U.S. but installed by a foreign manufacturer in a computer made overseas. The
court noted the distinction in enforcing U.S. law at home and abroad “applies with
particular force in patent law.” Id. at 455.

